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ARTICLES
Separate But Equal: The Low Road
Reconsidered
By DONALD E. LIvELY*
Introduction
The Supreme Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education ' that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."2 In so doing, it
determined that equal protection could not be fully secured even by ef-
forts calculated to eliminate tangible educational disparities.3 The Court
concluded instead that it "must look to the effect of segregation itself on
public education." 4 Upon doing so, it determined that racial segregation
* Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo. A.B., University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley; M.S., Northwestern University; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles.
Professor Phillip Closius provided valuable comments upon an early draft. Research assistance
by Orene Bryant and Simi Fasehun was performed in an especially able and discerning fashion.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 495. The "separate but equal" doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court concluded that a state law, requiring
railroads to provide "equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races" did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 540. Adapta-
tion of the doctrine to other contexts was presaged generally by the spirit of the Court's deci-
sion and its specific observation that "[tihe distinction between laws interfering with the
political equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two races in schools,
theatres and railway carriages has been frequently drawn by this court." Id. at 545. The
doctrine was not abandoned until 1954. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
3. The Court acknowledged "findings below that the Negro and white schools involved
have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications
and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors." Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. Still, actual
equalization, even of tangible factors, never was realized under the separate but equal doctrine.
As the segregation principle became increasingly subject to constitutional attack, its defenders
attempted to perpetuate it by making incrementally stronger efforts to minimize the tangible
disparities. However, per capita spending for white students remained much higher than for
black students. South Carolina in 1915, for instance, spent almost 10 times more money per
white student than per black student. See A. Li.wIs, PORTRAIT OF A DECAD)E: THE SECOND
AMERICAN REVOI.UTION 20 (1964). By 1954, southern states were averaging expenditures of
$165 per white student and $115 per black student. Id.
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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had a detrimental effect upon the victims of discrimination,5 thus deny-
ing them equal educational opportunities and equal protection of the
law.6
For nearly two decades following the Brown decision, the Court's
adherence to the desegregation precept was unbending.' In the early
1970's, as the focus spread from the South to the North and West, the
Court began to formulate major limiting principles that narrowed the
desegregation mandate's reach.' During the 1980's, the consequences of
those decisions have become increasingly visible. In major population
centers, education is substantially separate,9 unequal, and often immune
to desegregation. Moreover, many schools, once desegregated, have been
constitutionally freed to resegregate. 10
5. Id. at 494. The Court noted that segregation had a detrimental effect which was
heightened when it had "the sanction of the law." Id. Implicit, at least, would seem to be the
notion that racial segregation of school children, regardless of cause, had adverse consequences
upon educational opportunity. Id.
6. The Court identified "education [as] the most important function of state and local
governments." Id. at 493. It pointed out that education
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities ... the very
foundation of good citizenship... a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training.., in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment ... [and in affording a reasonable chance] to
succeed in life....
Id. Thus, it concluded that public education "is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms." Id. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court retreated from any notion of
education being a fundamental right. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973).
7. The Court's paramount purpose at the time was to fashion remedies that would elimi-
nate racially identifiable schools. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 18 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
8. Those principles conditioned the duty to desegregate upon the cause of racial separa-
tion, narrowed the basis for and the availability of remedies in metropolitan areas, and made
the duty to desegregate a transient one. See infra notes 100-144 and accompanying text.
9. The public school systems of such cities as Baltimore and Washington, D.C., for in-
stance, are more t~han 90% black. See Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521,
528 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986). Separateness is especially conspicuous in
cities where the student population is predominantly black. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 271 n.3 (1977) (Detroit's public school population was 71.5% black, 26.4% white,
and 2.1% other ethnic groups). Contributing to the condition is the Court's deference to
school district lines and consequent reluctance to impose metropolitan remedies. See infra
notes 121-130.
10. See Pasadena City Bd. ofEduc. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,437 (1976); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 32. Modern segregation in metropolitan areas has
proved especially impervious to the desegregation mandate. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
at 782, 804-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Characteristic of such separation are substantial dis-
paraties in funding and educational progress. For example, average pupil expenditures ap-
proximate $3,000 in Ohio's three largest cities-Cleveland, Columbus. and Cincinnati-and
over $4,000 in nearby predominantly white suburbs. See S'rATE OP OHio. DEPARTMENT 01:
EDUCATION, COSTS PER PupIl., Table I at 5, 7-8, and Table 2 at 28, 30-31 (1984-85). Con-
Given the principles which have narrowed the desegregation man-
date's ambit," coupled with the white flight phenomenon 12 particularly
characteristic of major population centers, it is evident that racially sepa-
rate schooling is a reality that will endure into the foreseeable future. To
the extent its linkage to official action is declared too remote, segregation
is constitutionally acceptable.13 Consonant with such cause-oriented
analysis, resegregation is permissible even where desegregation had been
decreed.
14
The promise of meaningful equality associated with the desegrega-
tion mandate appears incomplete to the extent much segregation, be-
cause of its characterization, is constitutionally immune. As it has
become apparent that comprehensive and enduring integration has been
placed beyond the ken of constitutional proscription, in major population
centers or where a reversion to past patterns occurs, the theme of elimi-
nating dual school systems has assumed a hollow tone.15 Unless fortified
or augmented by pragmatic responses to modern realities, the net accom-
plishment of the desegregation principle may prove minimal. 6
cern that center city schools are breeding grounds for an urban underclass is reinforced by
education achievement scores in reading, science, and mathematics that, on a scale of 100,
range from about 10 to 15 points below the national mean-which is approximately 60-
compared with suburban scores which range from about 10 to 15 points above the mean. See
U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDU-
CATION PROGRESS, Tables 17-19-(1985) (for ages 9, 13, and 17, by subject and by selected
characteristics).
11. See infra notes 100-144 and accompanying text.
12. White flight denotes the resettlement process by "wealthier whites [who] successfully
immunize themselves from desegregation remedies that less wealthy groups have been unable
to avoid." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1042 (1978). Its destabilizing effect
upon desegregation efforts is typified by demographics presented in a case which the Supreme
Court declined to hear. In 1970, the population of Norfolk, Virginia, was 70% white and 28%
black. Student enrollment in public schools was 57% white and 43% black. Riddick v.
School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
Desegregation was ordered in 1971. Id. By 1980, the overall city population had declined
more than 11%. and school enrollment had dropped by 37%. Id. The racial composition of
the city had shifted to 61% white and 35% black, and in the schools to 42.6% white and
57.4% black-almost the exact reverse of a decade earlier.
13. See infra notes 100-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-141 and accompanying text.
15. The Court's original expectation was that the desegregation process would make it no
longer "possible to identify a 'white' school or a 'Negro' school." Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. See
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 435. Modem realities, shaped by limiting principles
that have restricted the desegregation mandate's reach and by the consequences of white flight,
have contributed to the perpetuation of those distinctions.
16. Despite recognizing education as an important individual and social interest, the
Court has refused to consider it a fundamental right and thus has not employed heightened
scrutiny to review funding disparities. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973). Consequently, substantial equality of education is not guaranteed. Id. at
36-37. Because racial segregation which is not officially mandated or the product of official
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During the 1970's it became evident that not all forms of school
segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7 It is now questiona-
ble whether the gains made even where desegregation occurred will en-
dure or prove ephemeral. 8  The Court's drift from forceful
administration of the desegregation mandate has been especially unpropi-
tious because the Court, in embracing and later modifying the desegrega-
tion precept, adopted no auxiliary equal protection principles. 9 The
insistence and resolve, which once were the dominant aspects of the
Court's posture, were essential for communicating its expectations to re-
calcitrant state and local officials.2" That firmness has receded, however,
as primary responsibility for desegregation effectuation and integration
maintenance has been transferred to state and local officials.
Invalidation of the separate but equal doctrine was accompanied by
the observation that "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy [v.
Ferguson] was written."'" Since public schooling in the nineteenth cen-
tury was a limited and underdeveloped reality, history affords few in-
sights into the precise meaning of equal protection in the area of
education.2" Given the evolution and consequences of constitutional
intent does not evoke close judicial scrutiny, subsequent resegregation does not engender an
insistence upon equalization which at least was an option, even if underutilized, prior to the
Brown decision.
17. Segregation that was not found to be proximately linked to official action, for instance,
is excluded from the desegregation mandate. See infra notes 100-144 and accompanying text.
Included in the constitutional exemption is segregation resulting from population shifts, even if
resettlement is prompted by a desegregation order.
18. Once desegregation occurs and a school system becomes unitary, no duty exists to
prevent resegregation from occurring unless it is the product of discriminatory action.
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976); Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32.
Freedom from the duty to desegregate has been granted in several major population centers.
See infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of City of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986); Vaughns v. Board of
Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721
F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Hendry School Dist., 504 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. The notion that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" essentially
displaced principles, that purportedly required an equalization focus, in favor of a desegrega-
tion remedy that was expected to promote equal educational opportunities. See Brown, 347
U.S. at 494-95.
20. Because of widespread resistance and delay by state and local officials, accompanied
by freedom of choice plans and other methodologies not really designed to effectuate the deseg-
regation mandate, the Court insisted not only upon functional desegregation plans but upon
plans that would work immediately. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 435;
Griffin v. Prince Edward County Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
22. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, and later when Plessy v. Fergu-
son was authored, public education was in its embryonic state and neither widely developed
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analysis since Brown, however, it would be tempting to "turn back the
clock" to 1954.23 In enunciating the desegregation principle, the Court
presumed that the elimination of segregated educational facilities would
help engender equality in both a legal and practical sense.24 It probably
did not contemplate that more than a generation later, "separate but
equal" actually might be traded for separate, period.
The central problem which the Brown Court set out to resolve was
the effective denial of equal educational opportunity tied to the system-
atic subordination of a racial group.2" Official racial separation, accom-
panied by unequal and inadequate resources, successfully perpetuated
that condition. The desegregation formula, therefore, was a logical doc-
trinal substitute for a principle that, papered by equal protection mouth-
ings, facilitated oppression. Having abandoned a doctrine which
conditioned an overt equality component, however, the Court's dedica-
tion to the desegregation mandate and the principle's capacity for flexible
application became critical. As segregation persisted or resurfaced in
new forms, and the precept was not recalibrated to address new realities,
insistence upon elimination of all racially identifiable schools26 developed
into an increasingly qualified mandate. The rigid application of the de-
segregation principle, evinced by a disinclination to use it to address
modern realities, has contributed to or at least betrayed a concession to
segregation's durability, entrenchment, and expanding legal acceptabil-
ity.27 Because the Court's commitment to desegregation has proved to
be neither sweeping nor enduring, too much may have been lost in the
1954 doctrinal transaction.
Although generally dismissed as a morally bankrupt footnote in
nor available. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 490; L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 46
(1986) [hereinafter TRIBE, HONORABLE COURT].
23. The temptation might arise in response to the limiting principles that substantially
narrowed the reach of the Court's mandate in Brown. See infra notes 100-144 and accompany-
ing text.
24. Finding "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
no place," the Court observed that segregation "has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children" that denies them equality in educational opportunity and under the law. Brown, 347
U.S. at 493.
25. The Court accordingly was guided by concern that the denial of an equal educational
opportunity pursuant to racial considerations ensures that the adversely affected group will
have a lesser chance of succeeding in life. Id. See also Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 487-88 (1976).
26. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 18; Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. at 435.
27. The Court has been perceived by some as softening its position on desegregation, be-
ginning in the early 1970's, consonant with the public's mood. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); B. SCHWARTZ, Swann's WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING
CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT 186-89 (1986).
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legal history,2" Plessy v. Ferguson affords a departure point for addressing
some of the consequences of segregation that otherwise are constitution-
ally unreachable. The separate but equal doctrine failed constitutionally
because it disguised a commitment to separate, rather than equal.29 In a
society apparently destined to remain largely segregated, however, a re-
constituted separate but equal concept at least might afford an analytical
predicate for offsetting the disparities that remain untouched so long as
separate conditions persist.
Instead of concluding that certain differences in education are im-
measurable, as the Court did in rejecting the separate but equal doc-
trine,"° the existence of disparities in both tangible and intangible factors
alone is a compelling reason for attempting to equalize them. If strictly
measured and assessed, the cost of offsetting disparities conceivably
might prove prohibitive.31 To the extent such analysis helped make the
perpetuation of segregation impractical, equal protection interests ulti-
mately might profit.32 At a minimum, secondary principles focusing
upon the effect of segregation would afford a constitutional safety net to
ensure that equality principles were not displaced entirely.
Because separate no longer must be equal, and modem, constitu-
tionally resistant strains of segregation continue to evolve, the uncondi-
28. The observation, that the separate but equal doctrine would "in time prove to be quite
as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case," proved to be an
"accurate prophe[sy]." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629
(1983) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). The
separate but equal doctrine has been criticized for having created "a shallow illusion of equal-
ity." L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1019-20.
29. Shortly after embracing the doctrine, for instance, the Court upheld a school district's
decision, based upon economic reasons, to provide a high school education for whites but not
for blacks. See Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); see inh(a notes 48-59 and
accompanying text. Later, in another context, when some efforts were made to provide com-
parable facilities, the Court concluded that such intangibles as faculty, reputation, position and
influence of alumni, and connections and opportunity could not be equalized. See Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
30. Even before rejecting the separate but equal doctrine altogether, the Court diverged
from it to the extent important differences could be identified "which are incapable of objective
measurement." Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. at 634. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
31. Part of the original strategy behind litigation designed to havc official segregation
eventually declared unconstitutional, was the insistence upon equalization to the point costs
would become demonstrably excessive and the separatist system would thus collapse under its
own weight. See K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 123-25 (1984). However, in at
least one instance, defendants demonstrated a resolve to equalize at any cost rather than dis-
mantle a segregated system. See id. at 128.
32. A recent court order, to the effect that Kansas City and the state of Missouri must
spend $196 million to improve the quality of largely segregated urban schools, has evoked
official outcries that compliance would devastate Missouri's budget and would be unaffordable.
See It's Full Steam Ahead for Magnet Schools, Kansas City Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at Al, AI0.
[Vol. 14:43
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tional trade-in of equalization merits rethinking. Part I of this Article
reviews the origins and failure of the separate but equal doctrine. Part II
demonstrates how abandonment of the separate but equal doctrine pref-
aced further displacement of equality principles. It also discusses Brown
and its progeny, focusing on the dilution of the desegregation mandate.
Part III suggests a modem equal where separate principle which, even if
not a permanent solution, may be responsive to the consequnces of per-
sisting and recurring school segregation especially in major population
centers.
I. The Separate But Equal Doctrine: An
Emphasis Upon Separatism
The separate but equal doctrine, conceived in Plessy v. Ferguson,33
was calibrated to perpetuate separateness rather than to eliminate ine-
quality.34 The principle, even when first propounded, was not univer-
sally subscribed to because the doctrinal terms were merely a transparent
disguise for unconstitutional ways and means.35 Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy noted that the formula essentially acted as a mechanism for
protecting a dominant class36 and sanctioned a classification scheme that
stigmatized blacks and fostered stereotypes. 37  Still, the majority ob-
served that the Fourteenth Amendment, even though designed to ensure
absolute legal equality, "could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from polit-
ical equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either."' 38 Thus, the Court promoted the illusion that
33. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34. The "apparent symmetry in treatment created only a shallow -illusion of equality
[which eventually] prompted the Court in Brown v. Board of Education to overturn legally-
compelled segregation in public schools." L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1019. As discussed in
Part II (infra notes 73-144 and accompanying text), the Court's promise in 1954 propounded
another illusion begetting further disappointment, to the extent neither desegregation nor
equalization has been realized.
35. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. He noted that contrary to the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, "it seems that
we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant race-a superior class of citizens, which as-
sumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights ... upon the basis of race." Id. at 560. Justice
Harlan envisioned that judicial endorsement of the separate but equal doctrine "will not only
stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored
citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by state law to defeat equal protection
guarantees." Id.
37. Id. at 562.
38. 163 U.S. at 544. Examples that the Court offered to demonstrate the settled "nature
of things" proved anything but firmly cast. It noted that the most common instance of legal
segregation "is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children." Id. The Court also observed that "the constitutionality of [such classification] does
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official racial separation did not connote inferiority39 and that it fell
within the ambit of a state's police power.4"
The formal segregation endorsed by the Court was subject to the
minimally limiting principle that any exercise of state police power
which classified on the basis of race had to be reasonable.4" Although
reasonableness theoretically would have been exceeded if separatism was
calculated to oppress a particular ethnic group, the possibility of invali-
dation on such grounds was minimal.42 Unlike modem equal protection
analysis,43 the standard for reviewing official racial classifications was a
deferential rather than a heightened one.' Consequently, a classification
scheme, whether motivated by genuine---albeit unenlightened- attempts
not seem to have been questioned." Id. at 551. A mere three years later, and during the next
half century, such questions were raised. See infra notes 48-72 and accompanying text.
Although official classification pursuant to the "nature of things" now supposedly is dis-
reputable, such differentiations have crept back into the legislative process and have survived
judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in which the Court con-
cluded that exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance coverage was not a gender-based
classification, because no risks existed from which men or women as a group were excluded.
Id. at 496-97. The Court's determination evoked criticism to the effect that the plan afforded
dissimilar treatment based upon "physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex" and
that the classification should not be blithely regarded as "in the nature of things." Id. at 501
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. The Court concluded that any such implication was "not by reason or anything found
in the act, but solely because the colored race cho[se] to put that construction upon it." Plessy,
163 U.S. at 551.
40. Id. at 544.
41. Id. at 550. The Court implied, therefore, that separation on the basis of hair color,
alienage or nationality, or laws assigning sidewalks on the basis of race or requiring white
person's houses to be painted white and "colored men's black, or their vehicles or business
signs to be of different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other,
or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color," would be unreasona-
ble. Id. at 549-50.
42. See id. The Court stated it would tolerate only "such laws as are enacted in good faith
for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular
class." Id. at 550. Its citation to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (186), which involved a
municipal regulation selectively applied to Chinese laundries, suggested that the Court might
respond to instances of discrimination uncamouflaged by trappings of social custom and tradi-
tion. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
43. Racial classifications now are regarded as suspect and consequently unlikely to be
based upon a valid purpose. Thus, they are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny and justified
only by compelling state interests. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Such review has been described as "strict in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreward In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
44. The standard for assessing the constitutionality of a racial classification scheme was
mere reasonableness. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. By regarding custom, tradition, preserva-
tion of public peace, comfort, and order as proper bases for official classifications, the Court
afforded legislatures ample room to perpetuate a separatist society. Id.
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to promote public well-being,4" or by oppressive and supremacist in-
stincts,46 would rarely fail to pass constitutional muster.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the separate but equal doctrine in prac-
tice accentuated separation.47 Any expectation that constitutional com-
mitment to equality would be comparable to that for separateness was
dispelled shortly after the Court embraced the separate but equal
concept.
An early test of the principle, in Cumming v. Board of Education,a"
proved it to be so flimsy that even egregiously unequal education was
countenanced. In Cumming, the Court permitted a school board to deny
a high school education to blacks even though it provided one to
whites.49 By making the equality component virtually inoperative, the
Court essentially signaled that the availability of public education at the
time could be racially determined without constitutional offense."
Consistent with the spirit of the separate but equal doctrine, an op-
portunity for a meaningful education, much less an equal one, was a
45. See id. The Plessy Court, in recognizing a state's interest in "preservation of the pub-
lic peace and good order," id., was unpersuaded by Justice Harlan's argument that "[tihe sure
guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct unconditional recognition
... of every right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens
... without regard to race." Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Antimiscegenation laws that were enacted and left undisturbed until the late 1960's,
for instance, were intended "to maintain white supremacy." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967).
47. Not until 1938 did the Court actually find inequality in a state policy of educational
segregation. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Even so, it was not
until the disparity, created by the absence of any state law school for blacks, was so egregious
that it was virtually impossible to ignore. "[A]t the university level no provision for Negro
education was a rule rather than an exception." Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to
Achieve Racial Integration in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC.
316, 319 (1952). Still, two Justices would have reached a different result because the state had
acted "upon the view that the best interest of her people demands separation of whites and
negroes in schools," Gaines, 305 U.S. at 353 (McReynolds, J., joined by Butler, J., dissenting),
and because public education "maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respec-
tive states." Id. (quoting Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899)). Before aban-
doning the separate but equal principle, the Court never insisted upon equalization of schools
below the post-graduate level. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
48. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
49. Id. at 542. The county had abolished a black high school, for claimed economic rea-
sons, but continued to maintain a high school for white girls and helped fund a sectarian high
school for white boys.
50. Justice Harlan, who had dissented so vigorously in Plessy v. Ferguson, found in Cum-
ming "that it was within the discretion of the Board to establish high schools." Id. Thus, the
Court's response to black taxpayers who filed the suit was that allocation of tax monies is not
governed by the Constitution and, in any event, "it is impracticable to distribute taxes
equally." Id. Absent any constitutional control upon expenditures, it is difficult to envision
how the second half of the separate but equal doctrine could have been enforced.
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mere pretense.5 Almost immediately, the sheerness of the separate but
equal doctrine's disguise became manifest. Contrary to the Court's ear-
lier observations that inferiority was mistakenly inferred by the primary
victims of segregation, and not implied by the classification, 52 its en-
dorsement of schemes which separated and set rights and benefits ac-
cording to race proved just the opposite.
Several decades passed before the Court, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,53 afforded more serious attention to the "equality" guarantee of
the separate but equal doctrine. It did so, however, only in response to
challenges directed increasingly toward the validity of the doctrine it-
self. 4 The Court in Gaines considered whether a state, by providing a
law school for whites but not for blacks, denied equal protection.5 5
Although the state offered to pay out-of-state tuition for the protesting
student's legal education, the Court found the state had defaulted upon
its constitutional obligation to maintain "the equality of legal right to the
enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up."5 6 Having consid-
ered whether the state had provided legal privileges to whites which it
denied to blacks, the Court concluded that the state had done precisely
that and thus had denied equal protection on the basis of race.57 Unlike
its analysis in Cumming, the Gaines Court recognized that tying the
availability of education to race fostered not only separation but "uncon-
stitutional discrimination."5 8 Absent other opportunities for in-state
51. The Cumming Court employed a balancing of harm analysis especially geared toward
the separate but equal doctrine. Thus, it concluded that because primary education would
have been denied to 300 black children if the Board "maintained a separate school for the sixty
children who wished to have a high school education[,] ... its decision was in the interest of
the greater number of colored children." Id. at 544. Rather than grant relief that would
equalize, the Court concluded that denying a high school education to whites would take away
their educational opportunities without providing any such opportunity to blacks. Id. Justice
Harlan thus took an active hand in facilitating a system that promoted racial inequality in a
particularly profound way.
52. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. The result of this analysis demonstrated the accuracy of
Justice Harlan's forecast that a racial classification scheme would be used to mete out and
regulate rights and benefits. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
54. Until 1938, litigants had not contested the validity of the separate but equal doctrine
but asserted that equal facilities were unavailable. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 80
(1927); Cumming, 175 U.S. at 530-31.
55. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 345.
56. Id. at 349-50. The Court observed that the failure to afford a legal education within
the state, because of race, constituted "discrimination, [which] if not reliev'ed... would [be] a
denial of equal protection." Id. at 345.
57. Id. at 349-50. The Court observed that the obligation "cannot be cast by one State
upon another, and no State can be excused from performance by what another State may do or




legal training, the "petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law
school of the State University." 9 By accentuating the equality factor for
the first time, the Court unveiled an equal protection enforcement mech-
anism which was to be abandoned when the Court embraced the concept
of desegregation.
The equality focus evolved further before the separate but equal doc-
trine was displaced, but it never was employed outside the context of
graduate education, 60 nor was the equality requirement necessarily en-
forced in a meaningful way.61 However, in Sweatt v. Painter,62 the Court
served notice that it no longer would be satisfied with token equalization.
Unlike the facts pertinent to previous decisions,63 a state "law school for
Negroes" had been created."4 Still, the Court found the school unequal
for constitutional purposes and directed the white law school to admit
the plaintiff.6" The order reflected the Court's most penetrating effort, as
of that time, to identify factors in the educational process which had to
be equalized. Noting that the white school had a stronger faculty,
broader range of courses, better library, larger student body, and more
extensive student activities, the Court determined that the black school
was inferior.66 Its analysis, however, did not stop with an assessment of
physical or readily palpable differences. Rather, it identified intangible
qualities, such as faculty reputation, alumni position and influence, insti-
tutional traditions and prestige, and linkage to professional opportuni-
ties, as relevant factors in the equality calculus that were "incapable of
59. Id. at 352.
60. The four cases in which the Court focused upon equalization were McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (graduate school); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (law school); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (law
school); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (law school).
61. For instance, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, ordered a state to provide a legal
education at an in-state law school for blacks or at the state university "as soon as it does for
applicants of any other group." Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948). When
the state merely roped off a portion of its capitol building and termed it a black law school, the
Court, despite arguments of patent inequality, denied further relief. See Fisher v. Hurst, 333
U.S. 147 (1948).
62. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
63. Central to the Court's previous decisions was the absence of any state supported
school for blacks. See Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. at 633; Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349-52.
64. 339 U.S. at 633. The trial court, recognizing that conditioning the opportunity for a
legal education upon race was incompatible with equal protection, had stayed proceedings "to
allow the State to supply substantially equal facilities." Id. It later determined that the newly
created institution afforded "privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law
substantially equivalent to those afforded by the State for white students." Id.
65. Id. at 635-36.
66. Id. at 632-34.
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objective measurement."67
The implication, that certain factors pertinent to assessing equality
defied measurement,68 suggested that the separate but equal doctrine
might be living on borrowed time. Leading further toward its demise
was the Court's decision in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Education.69 In McLaurin, the Court held that racially deter-
mined seating arrangements in a university classroom, cafeteria, and li-
brary directly impaired the "pursuit of effective graduate instruction.
70
In both Sweatt and McLaurin, the principle of segregation was displaced
pursuant to an emerging perception that certain disparities could not be
bridged and that separate could never be equal. Although the Court
found it unnecessary at the time to reconsider the separate but equal doc-
trine,71 the focus upon intangible differences and resultant remedies pref-
aced its inevitable displacement.
72
II. Separate is Inherently Unequal: The Reconstitutionalizing
of Segregation
The Supreme Court's conclusion, in 1954, that separate inherently
constituted unequal, was accompanied by the sense that immediate
change could not be imposed by judicial fiat.73 A cautious sense of its
enforcement capability notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether the Court
fully appreciated how deeply separatist instincts were engrained in soci-
ety and the consequent lengths to which persons would go in resisting
67. Id. at 634.
68. Id.
69. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
70. Id. at 641. The Court found that by impairing the "ability to study, to engage in
discussion, and exchange views with other students, and in general, to learn [the] profession"
the students were denied equal protection. Id.
71. The doctrine actually was challenged in Sweatt v. Painter. See K. RIPPLE, supra note
31, at 128-29. Noting that constitutional decisions "will be drawn as narrowly as possible,"
the Sweatt Court remarked that "much of the excellent research and detailed argument
presented in these cases is unnecessary to their disposition." 339 U.S. at 631.
72. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636. Eventually, the Court concluded that those intangible "con-
siderations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools." Brown, 347 U.S. at
494.
73. The Court undoubtedly anticipated a response which has been characterized as "elec-
tric and widely divergent." A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFr TO WARREN 180
(1958). To diffuse public hostility that a wholesale rejection of the separate but equal doctrine
may have been expected to precipitate, the Court limited its holding to the effect "that in the
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Brown, 347 U.S. at
495. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONA. LAW 574-76 (1986). Con-
sistent with the realization that desegregation would not occur overnight, the Court originally
required it "with all deliberate speed" and turned to the lower courts for implementation.
Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
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racial mixing. Nor could it have contemplated the opportunities that
would become increasingly available to avoid segregation.
When announced, the desegregation principle engendered immedi-
ate and widespread resistence, delay, evasion, and actual mutiny by lower
federal courts. 74 Although the Court for nearly two decades after Brown
insisted upon the dismantling of dual school systems, its new analytical
mode was a prelude for incomplete and fleeting results. 75 Separate edu-
cation, especially outside the South, was not overtly enforced by the State
and was attributed to other factors including housing and employment
patterns.76 Even if the Brown Court might have pondered the desirability
of expanding its mandate to respond to those influences, it is doubtful
that it could have forecast the social dynamics that would evolve inde-
pendently and help defeat any far-reaching desegregation. Increasing
personal mobility, tied to a growing national economy, eroded traditional
rootedness in a community or neighborhood. The simultaneous growth
of suburbs defined urban areas in broader metropolitan terms and pro-
vided a sanctuary for those wanting to escape racial mixing or its per-
ceived consequences. Especially to the extent old neighborhoods were
left behind for new ones, desegregation became a task that could not be
accomplished within the relatively simple framework of a single district.
The march to the suburbs, accompanied by the creation of districts that
were new and without a history of discrimination, ushered in new reali-
ties that the Court later would address.77 The legacy of that eventual
confrontation is a series of limiting principles that leaves the desegrega-
tion mandate facially intact but countenances much existing or recurrent
segregation78 and leaves much of the Brown Court's equal protection
hopes unfulfilled.
74. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
75. The duty to desegregate became more narrowly drawn and transient pursuant to lim-
iting principles, discussed infra notes 100-144, which have enabled the North and West in
particular to avoid the mandate. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218-19 & nn.
3-4 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (desegregation "in many nonsouthern cities
with large minority populations" has not been realized "primarily because of the dejfcio/de
jure distinction").
76. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480-81 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
77. See infra notes 100-144 and accompanying text.
78. Once a school system achieves unitary status, a court may not order further relief in
response to subsequent changes in neighborhood ethnicity, so-called immutable geographic
factors, or demographic shifts for which the system is not held accountable. See Riddick v.
School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d at 536-37 (citing Davis v. East Baton Rouge School
Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir. 1983)); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218,
225 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437 (1976).
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Under Plessy, the equality factor was, for the most part, dormant.
But because it constituted half of the doctrine, at least externally, the
Court if it was so inclined could choose to emphasize it.7 9 By contrast,
under Brown and its progeny, the equality factor may be dormant be-
cause it has ceased to exist in an overt form. 80
In reassessing the separate but equal doctrine, the Court was not
obligated to discard it entirely. 8 The opportunity existed, for instance,
to use it as a saber rather than as a shield.82 Consistent with Sweatt v.
Painter, desegregation might have been conditioned upon a failure to
demonstrate that comprehensive and substantial equality existed. 3
Building upon previous determinations that certain disparities defied
measurement or were irreducible, however, the Court moved a step fur-
ther and asserted categorically that segregation and equality were mutu-
ally exclusive.84 Relying upon observations by social scientists,8 5 it noted
79. See infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
80. Education, moreover, is not a fundamental right, so equality of educational opportu-
nity is not constitutionally guaranteed. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973). Absent disparities that are the product of intentional racial discrimina-
tion, differences in educational quality will not trigger heightened scrutiny. Id. at 28.
81. The Court claimed that, in earlier cases, it had found such obvious inequality resulting
from actual denial of educational opportunities that it had not been "necessary to re-examine
the doctrine." Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
82. The litigation strategy which eventually defeated the separate but equal doctrine was
calculated to seek "absolute and complete equalization of curricula, faculty, and physical
equipment in white and black schools." Marshall, supra note 47, at 3 IS. It succeeded in
demonstrating the sterility and futility of the separate but equal concept. See K. RIPPLE, supra
note 31, at 122-34. Despite insisting upon desegregation, the Court could have continued to
insist upon "absolute equalization," especially where segregation has proved to be constitu-
tionally resistant.
83. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. The Court, by ordering the admission
of blacks into white law schools, had constructed a possible framework for desegregation. See
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
The state, in Sweatt v. Painter, actually was disposed to make "every effort to show that if [the
black law school] was not equal [at least] insofar as physical facilities were concerned, it would
be made equal in short order." Marshall, supra note 47, at 319. Especially if expanded so that
it focused also upon intangibles, the separate but equal doctrine would afford a broad cutting
edge for equality interests rather than a mere shield for the established order. Furthermore,
evidence existed at the time the Court rejected the separate but equal doctrine that some effort
was being made to equalize the quality of physical facilities, faculty, and course offerings.
84. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
85. The Court cited to several prominent psychologists and sociologists to support its
conclusion that segregation was detrimental in an educational setting. Sc" id. at 494 n.l 1. In
several of the cases joined and reversed by the Court, social scientists had testified regarding
the harmful effects of segregation upon students. See K. RIPPi.E, supra note 31, at 132- 33. On
appeal, a statement by 32 sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists, em-
phasizing those harms, was submitted. See The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. Rr.v. 427 (1953). Reliance on such
data has engendered criticism similar to that which followed the use of medical and other
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that separation of children "solely because of their race generates a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.",8 6 Based upon
those findings, the Court concluded that the separate but equal doctrine
crossed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.87
The Court in Brown embraced a principle designed to promote
equalization of educational opportunities indirectly.88 By failing to
retain principles that overtly promoted parity,89 no secondary or fall
back principles remained to protect or promote equal protection values
in the event the desegregation mandate faded or became overwhelmed by
new realities. The Court, in ordering desegregation, assigned primary
responsibility for implementation "with all deliberate speed"9 to local
officials and courts. 91 School districts-with.the complicity of lower fed-
eral courts-seized the mandate as an opportunity to resist desegregation
and adopted plans that were subterfuges,9" and engaged in delaying
studies in delineating the liberty to choose an abortion. In both contexts, critics have asserted
findings are changeable and "have an uncertain expectancy of life." See Cahn, Jurisprudence,
30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150, 157-59, 167 (1955) (desegregation); Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting ) (the trimester analysis
that delineates abortion and fetal rights is on a collision course with itself as medical advances
push reasons for regulating maternal health forward toward childbirth, and fetal viability
backward toward the point of conception).
86. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
87. Id. at 495. The Court noted that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place." Id.
88. Desegregation by itself does not equalize but was conceived as a methodology that
would create equal educational opportunities. See id. at 494-95.
89. Although used primarily to maintain segregation, the separate but equal doctrine's
equality component enabled the Court to insist upon parity if it so chose. See supra notes 53-
70 and infra notes 154-156.
90. Brown, 349 U.S. at 294, 301.
91. Id. at 299.
92. Such purported desegregation plans actually were designed to perpetuate segregation.
Arkansas, for instance, enacted a law intended to free students from compulsory attendance at
biracial schools. The statute was engendered by a state constitutional amendment requiring
the legislature to approve "in every Constitutional manner the Un-constitutional desegregation
decisions ... of the United States Supreme Court," and led to desegregation at federal bayonet
point. ARK. CONsT. amend. 44 (cited in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1958)). Other
sham desegregation plans invalidated by the Court included freedom of choice and transfer
plans that permitted students to move from schools where they were part of a minority to
schools where they would be part of a majority. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 439-42 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 685-87 (1963). Even after a detailed
statement of impermissible procedures and delineation of a federal court's power to alter at-
tendance zones for remedial purposes, many school systems continued to gerrymander district
lines in an effort to avoid the full impact of the desegregation mandate. See L. TRIBIE, Stupra
note 12, at 1036 (discussing the aftermath of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ..
402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
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tactics.93 States enacted legislation designed to thwart the order9 and
deterred efforts to have it enforced.95 Protracted litigation eventually
tested the Court's patience and caused it to insist on desegregation plans
that "promise[d] realistically to work now."9 6 Even then, deliberate stall-
ing and evasion succeeded in delaying or frustrating desegregation and
the equalizing effect it was expected to have.
97
Recalcitrant state and local officials and rebellious judges most fre-
quently are identified as scapegoats for the disappointing results of the
Court's desegregation mandate. 98 However, the Court's subsequent re-
sponses to the persistent challenges regarding what conditions required
desegregation, what remedies were permissible, and whether the duty to
desegregate was a lasting one have guided the desegregation mandate's
devolution. By fashioning major limiting principles, 99 the Court accom-
modated both old and new strains of segregation.
A. Principles Limiting the Reach of Desegregation: Intent
The first limiting principle propounded by the Court conditioned
the duty to desegregate upon the existence of officially induced segrega-
93. Such tactics were facilitated by the complicity of lower federal courts. The Court, for
instance, had to review a judicially created principle that desegregation actions could not be
entertained by a federal court until administrative remedies were exhausted. See McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). Federal district courts thus were in the vanguard of
obstructionism. By encouraging plans designed not to work, they furthered official stalling
and bad faith. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 863 (5th Cir.
1966). It was "not surprising," given such local judicial cheerleading, that many school offi-
cials did not face up to their responsibilities. Id.
94. See supra note 92.
95. One such deterrent was a law intended to disbar civil rights attorneys. Such legisla-
tion was struck down in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963).
96. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
97. Ten years after the desegregation order, only 2.14% of black students in 11 southern
states attended schools in which they were not a racial majority. See BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 124
(1974). Such results were the product of slow, token, or no response by officials responsible for
implementing the desegregation mandate. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963) (student transfer plan perpetuated rather than helped dismantle segregation); Bickel,
The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964):
Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil
Placement Acts, 62 CoI.uM. L. REv. 1448 (1962).
98. See, e.g., Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237, 245
(1968); Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63
CoI.uM. L. REV. 1163 (1963).
99. Those limiting principles include the de jure/de facto distinction, restrictions upon




tion.'° Equal protection objectives thus were subjected to a major con-
tingency.101 To the extent segregation could be attributed to factors
other than what the Court would consider purposeful state action, no
duty to desegregate would exist.'° 2 It thus became evident that desegre-
gation would be a selective rather than comprehensive concept, pertinent
only when a formal system of segregation had existed or a palpable dis-
criminatory intent could be identified. °3
By not acknowledging a linkage between government action and
segregated housing patterns, the Court overlooked or heavily discounted
the enduring effects of officially enforced racially restrictive covenants
and formal state policies."° It also evinced insensitivity to other realities
that precluded mixed neighborhoods. 105 Formulation of the de jure/de
100. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court stated that "the differ-
entiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or
intent to segregate." Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 238-41 (1976). The Court in Keyes drew a line between so-called de jure segregation,
which was the product of official action, and de facto segregation, which supposedly reflected a
racial imbalance untied to official action. 413 U.S. at 205-14. As a cut-off point for official
responsibility, however, the line may be illusory. Segregated housing, for instance, may be the
product of official enforcement of restrictive covenants or other policies. See id. at 216 (Doug-
las, J., concurring). The Federal Housing Administration adopted lending policies to protect
residential loans from "adverse influences" that included "racially inharmonious groups." P.
JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT: A VIEW OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE BOTTOM 139-41
(1967). State action also may contribute to racial neighborhoods by virtue of decisions con-
cerning the construction and closing of schools, employment of faculty and staff, assignment
of students, and distribution of urban development funds. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The formulation of policies which foster separate neighborhoods implicate the
state as much as overt separatist policies. Id. Rather than exploring those linkages to state
action in depth, the Court opted for bright but not necessarily sensitively drawn lines between
permissible and impermissible segregation. The real dividing line would appear to be between
overt and subtle forms of state action that promote segregation. Id.
101. Thus, "a finding of intentionally segregative action establishes.., a prima facie case of
unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
102. Id. at 215-16 (Douglas, J., concurring). Although officially mandated school segrega-
tion was most visible in the South, segregation in education was pervasive elsewhere. When
the de jure/de facto distinction had been drawn in the early 1970's, segregation was common
in nonsouthern cities. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT SURVEY (1971), reported in 118 CONG. REC. 563-66 (1972).
103. It has been noted that whatever progress has been made in dismantling officially segre-
gated systems, "[n]o comparable progress has been made in many non-southern cities ...
primarily because of the de jure-de facto distinction nurtured by the Courts and accepted com-
placently by many of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated schools in the
South." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Because educational
opportunity was an original concern motivating desegregation, and cause does not alter the
effect of segregation upon that opportunity, Justice Powell would have abolished the de
jure/de facto distinction. Id. at 218-19, 229-30, 253.
104. See supra note 100.
105. Effective deterrents to neighborhood diversity have included, with official complicity,
actual and threatened violence and property destruction. See, eg.. W. Tu'l-rl.i-. JR., RACE
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facto distinction constituted a watershed in the Court's responsiveness
and adaptability to the problem of segregation. Contrary to the Brown
Court's willingness to acknowledge and reject a failed doctrine, invest-
ment in the de jure/de facto distinction announced or at least prefaced a
reluctance to adjust equal protection doctrine to new realities tied to the
social dynamics of the post-Brown era. Comprehensive realization of
equal educational opportunity and elimination of racially identifiable
schools thus were placed beyond the ken of the desegregation mandate.
Given enhanced personal mobility and suburban development, which the
Brown Court could not fully envision but which were manifest when the
de jure/de facto distinction was drawn, the intent-based limiting princi-
ple became a basis for making much racially separate and unequal educa-
tion constitutionally acceptable.
The duty to desegregate, as limited by the de jure requirement, cre-
ated a substantial burden upon plaintiffs attempting to show that an obli-
gation to desegregate existed. 106 Proof that a school system was officially
segregated easily could be demonstrated.'° 7 Discriminatory intent when
not facial, however, is elusive105 Proof of intent thus became much more
difficult when segregation resulted from more subtle government action,
RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919, at 157-83 (1970); S. DR KE & H. CLAYTON,
BLACK METROPOLIS 174-80 (1945).
106. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219-22 (1971); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 224 (Powell,
J., concurring and dissenting).
107. Discriminatory purpose was self-evident in laws that required segregation, but govern-
ment action neutral on its face requires a more searching inquiry. See, e.g.. Personnel Admin'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979). The Court has observed that there are cases in which
"the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed." Id. at 275. However, be-
cause "reliable evidence of subjective intentions is seldom obtainable, resort to inference based
on objective factors is generally unavoidable." Id. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The ques-
tion of proof thus became one of considering degree, history, inevitability, foreseeability of and
alternatives to disproportionate impact, and other factors pertinent to~xard establishing dis-
criminatory intent. Id. Such analysis by its nature, however, necessarily requires a significant
amount of guesswork. Deduction of segregative intent thus has been characterized as a "tor-
tuous effort." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). The description
is particularly apt, given the Court's pronouncement that it is "extremely difficult... to ascer-
tain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enact-
ment." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. at 224 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
383 (1968)).
108. The task of proving intent is difficult because even the most routine decisions affect
segregation. Decisions which may have to be probed include:
[A]ction or nonaction with respect to school building construction and location; the
timing of building new schools and their size; the closing and consolidation of
schools; the drawing or gerrymandering of student attendance zones, the extent to
which a neighborhood policy is enforced; the recruitment, promotion and assignment
of faculty and supervisory personnel; policies with respect to trainsfers from one
school to another; whether, and to what extent, special schools Xxill be provided,
where they will be located, and who will qualify to attend them; the determination of
curriculum, including whether there will be "tracks" that lead primarily to college or
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particularly in the form of decisions concerning school sitings and clos-
ings, 0 9 attendance zones, and faculty hiring and assignment."10
The de jure principle, which emerged as a major liability limiting
concept is akin to the concept of proximate cause. Like that notion, it is
vulnerable to subjective policy determinations that influence the drawing
of legal dividing lines. 1" In either instance, a cut-off point is established
so that liability for consequences of a wrongful act does not extend indefi-
nitely. 112 Thus, the de jure/de facto distinction reflects a sense that even
if all segregation is ultimately traceable to official action, legal responsi-
bility necessary to trigger remedial action attenuates as the connection to
overt state action grows more distant. 13
to vocational training, and the routing of students into these tracks; and even deci-
sions as to social, recreational, and athletic policies.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 234-35 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Further complicating the
inquiry is the problem of varying and mixed motive. See Goodman, De Facto School Segrega-
tion: .A Constitutional and EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 284- 85 (1972). Conse-
quently, in those parts of the country which did not have laws requiring dual schools,
segregation was more difficult to prove. Generally, those areas also have a higher incidence of
segregation. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A STATUS REPORT 18-27 (1979).
109. The Court has recognized that the location of schools is highly determinative of resi-
dential development in metropolitan areas and has a particularly profound effect upon the
composition of inner city neighborhoods. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971). The common practice of closing schools in racially changing areas, and
building new ones in distant white suburbs and in the central cities, effectively has fostered
metropolitan segregation. See id. Despite surface appearances that may allow the result to be
dismissed as the product of residential housing patterns, such policies "when combined with
'neighborhood zoning' further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races."
Id.
110. Overlooked in the search for distinctions may be the reality that the "familiar root
cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially
the same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the
racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of
public school authorities." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
111. The concept of foreseeability, for instance, is pertinent for determining both discrimi-
natory intent and proximate cause. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-
65 (1979) (discriminatory intent); Pope v. Rollins, 703 F.2d 197, 202 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983) (negli-
gence). A determination of whether liability should be cut off for an individual's action which
may be linked to remote harm, or government action which may contribute inexorably to
segregation, nonetheless is likely to engender controversy rather than consensus. See supra
notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
112. Identifying the cut-off point, however, is a treacherous process that lends itself to
subjectivity, arbitrariness, and procrustean solutions.
113. The abatement of official responsibility nonetheless is troublesome, especially if it is
assumed that no school district exists "with any significant minority school population, in
which the school authorities-in one way or the other-have not contributed in some measure
to the degree of segregation which still prevails." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 252-53 (Powell, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
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Such line drawing is as perilous in constitutional law as it is in tort
law, because the search for cut-off points is vulnerable to subjectivity,
arbitrariness, guessing, and whim. 1 4 The delineation process creates
both controversy and division and, as evidenced by the bridling of the
desegregation principle, invites criticism by discounting official actions
and policies that foster a racially segregated society generally and schools
especially.I" Furthermore, the marking of constitutional perimeters pur-
suant to an intent-based analysis diminishes the underlying harms result-
ing from separation." 6
School district boundaries that yield racially distinct systems
whether proximately or more remotely caused by official action, may be
regarded as systemic dividing lines and a negative reminder by society of
one's place."1 7 When a "child perceives his separation as discriminatory
and invidious, he is not.., going to make fine distinctions about the
source of a particular separation.""' 8 The conclusion that a child's con-
stitutional rights are not implicated, because he was "born into a de-facto
society," thus seems facile and capricious." 9 To the extent racial separa-
tion suggests a systematic pattern, breeds a sense of inferiority, and im-
pairs educational development and opportunity, causation based
distinctions seem tied more to lines of convenience than of principle.1
20
114. Notions of proximate cause have given rise to a field of law which may be unsurpassed
for engendering disagreement and fostering confusion. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS 263 (West 1984). Because the consequences of an act may "go forxxard to eternity" and
liability otherwise would be infinite, boundaries are set upon legal responsibility pursuant to
"some social idea of justice or policy." Id. at 264. Because perceptions of justice and policy
preferences vary among individuals and according to context, the setting of liability limiting
concepts is especially difficult to accomplish in an invariably principled fashion.
115. If the decisions of a southern school board concerning school location and school
sizes can be said to have contributed to racial segregation among residential areas,
then with far greater force it can be argued that official state action in northern and
western cities has produced residential segregation. Until 1948, racially restrictive
covenants in deeds were regularly enforced by state courts; governmental action has
often located public housing in such a way as to intensify residential segregation; and,
in a variety of ways, the federal government's programs of subsidy and loan guaran-
tees have explicitly encouraged racial segregation in private housing.
Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nation-
wide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383, 388-89. See supra note 100.
116. See infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
117. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 119 (1970).
119. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir.
1967) (Gewin, J., dissenting)).
120. Justice Powell observed that cause based limiting principles sen ed no purpose other
than to "perpetuat[e] a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality." Keyes, 413 U.S.
at 219 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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B. Principles Limiting the Reach of Desegregation: The Sanctity of
School District Lines
A second major limiting principle further bounds the duty to deseg-
regate, even in the event of official and purposeful discriminatory action,
by purportedly conditioning the reach of any remedy upon the scope of
the constitutional violation. The qualifier has had particularly profound
consequences in major urban centers. In Milliken v. Bradley,12' for ex-
ample, a city school board purposely had created and maintained a segre-
gated system, and a district court had found that the state had
contributed significantly to that effort. 2' The Court, however, dis-
agreed with the trial court's findings of purposeful state action. 123 Having
found the relationship between cause and effect unconvincing, the Court
rejected an interdistrict remedy. 124 By sanctifying school district lines
and thus insulating suburban districts from the consequences of official
discriminatory practices, the Court essentially freed many of the nation's
metropolitan areas from the desegregation mandate.
125
Having set out to cure inequality by eliminating segregation, but
then narrowing the duty to desegregate by requiring a linkage to official
intent, the Court drew an even tighter equal protection circle.12 6 Lower
courts, which for almost two decades had been rebuked for not going far
121. 418 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1974).
122. The district court found that the city school board had created and maintained op-
tional attendance zones, bused students to distant schools for purposes of perpetuating segre-
gation, and chosen building sites that would ensure one-race schools. Id. at 725-26. It was
determined that the state had promoted segregation by nullifying a voluntary desegregation
plan, exercising responsibility over construction plans, supporting and approving a transporta-
tion scheme that fostered segregation and that was unequally funded, and sanctioning attend-
ance plans that perpetuated segregation. Id. at 734-35 n.16; id. at 770-71 (White, J.,
dissenting).
123. The Court defined the pertinent "constitutional right... [as one] to attend a unitary
school system .... Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or
arranged for white students in the [city] to attend schools in [the suburbs], they were under no
constitutional duty to make provisions for Negro students to do so." 418 U.S. at 746-47. The
dissenters in Milliken noted that both "[t]he District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that over a long period of years those in charge of the Michigan public schools engaged in
various practices calculated to effect the segregation of the Detroit school system." Id. at 762
(White, J., dissenting).
124. See 418 U.S. at 748.
125. Having "created a system where whites and Negroes were intentionally kept apart so
that they could not become accustomed to learning together," the geographically narrowed
remedy "allow[ed] the State to profit from its own" wrong. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
126. Justice Marshall, commenting on the limiting principle advanced in Milliken, noted
that "the Court's answer is to provide no remedy at all ... [thus] guaranteeing that Negro
children ... will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future as
they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past." Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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enough in effectuating desegregation,' 27 suddenly were admonished for
going too far.'28 The Court's longstanding insistence that a desegrega-
tion remedy must be effective, 129 was revised and made dependent upon
context. The Milliken decision officially exempted from the desegrega-
tion mandate many major population centers segregated along urban and
suburban lines. Without auxiliary equal protection principles to put
forth where the desegregation precept would not reach, the Court incon-
gruously began to emerge as a doctrinal source for separate and inher-
ently unequal education.13
The Milliken decision is consonant with the long-standing principle
that parents have a constitutionally based liberty interest in making deci-
sions regarding the education of their children. 3 Like any other pro-
tected liberty, however, it is not absolute. A singular concern for liberty,
as demonstrated by the separate but equal concept, actually may be a
"thin disguise" for competing constitutional concerns that merit at least
as much safeguarding. 3 2 The Brown Court, in abandoning the separate
but equal doctrine, concluded that equal protection interests demanded
some incursion upon otherwise unfettered liberty. Its radical shift in
equal protection focus represented a commitment to doctrinal change
necessary to effectuate meaningful equalization of educational
opportunity.
By finding suburban districts unlinked to past discrimination, which
perhaps too conveniently can be concluded to the extent they often are
too new to have any history, 133 the Court may insist that it remains true
to the Brown Court's focus upon dismantling officially segregated
schools. What it has propounded, however, is a principle that, despite
pertinence in the context of 1954, has not been allowed to grow and thus
has diminished relevance for modern realities. To the extent the Brown
127. The Court consistently had reminded lower courts of their duty to impose and enforce
desegregation plans. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 25; Davis v. School Comm'r, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
128. By limiting the scope of a desegregation remedy despite findings of state action, the
Court forced a retreat from a comprehensive plan to a less effective city only plan. See Milli-
ken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Prompt and effective remedies had been insisted upon, for instance, in Green v.
County School Board, 391 U.S. at 435, and Griffin v. Prince Edward County Board of Educa-
tion, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
130. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1928); Meyer v. Nebraska,
264 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923). Even proponents of the desegregation formula acknowledged
that it abridged "something that can be called a 'freedom of the white.''" Black, The Lawful-
ness of the Desegregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429 (1960).
132. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. But see infra note 139.
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Court evinced a commitment to tailoring and tuning constitutional doc-
trine so that equal protection objectives might be meaningfully effectu-
ated, the modem Court has abandoned that guiding spirit.
C. Principles Limiting the Reach of Desegregation:
Constitutional Resegregation
The third limiting principle emerged when the Court determined
that the duty to desegregate was a passing one.13 4 Consistent with the de
jure/de facto distinction, the elimination of segregation resulting from
official action discharges the obligation to desegregate. 135 Once a system
becomes unitary, school officials need not make adjustments to changing
residential or attendance patterns even if they result in resegregation.
136
Population redistribution after a desegregation order, however, does
not necessarily break the link between official action and segregation and
often is accelerated by it. 1 37 Even if resegregation may be a veiled result
of state action, desegregation will not be required absent some action
which the Court finds purposely discriminatory. 38 Modem segregation
may be a step removed from patent discriminatory action, but it is diffi-
cult to ignore the existence of a real connection. 139 Insofar as resegrega-
tion follows desegregation efforts, but the linkage to official action is cut,
the promise of "a school system in which all vestiges of enforced racial
segregation have been eliminated"1"" is fashioned into a short-term guar-
antee. To the extent the Court has removed resegregation from a chain
of events commenced by discriminatory practices and policies,' 4 ' it in
effect has expanded the concept of de facto segregation and further ex-
panded the category of constitutionally permissible segregation.
134. "[H]aving once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy
... perceived constitutional violations . .. ," no further duty to desegregate existed despite
demographic changes in the community. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 437 (1976). See also Swann, 402 U.S. at 32.
135. Absent "a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State
has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition
of the schools, further intervention ... should not be necessary." Swann, 402 U.S. at 32.
136. No such obligation exists provided resegregation is not a product of official tampering
designed to effectuate that result. Id.
137. See supra note 100.
138. Thus, the Court observed that the "quite normal pattern of human migration resulted
in . . . shifts in the racial makeup of some ... schools." Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436.
139. To the extent a state has "created a system where whites and Negroes were intention-
ally kept apart so that they could not become accustomed to learning together, [it] is responsi-
ble for the fact that many whites will react to the dismantling of that segregated system by
attempting to flee to the suburbs." Milliken, 418 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210-11.
141. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972).
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Implicit in the Court's abandonment of the separate but equal doc-
trine was the promise that it would pursue equal protection goals with
more powerful constitutional medicine.142 It is disquieting to realize,
therefore, that the desegregation principle has acquired a self-destruct
mechanism that is triggered regardless of any lasting or identifiable ac-
complishment. Given the various limiting principles adopted since
Brown, the Court's determination to charge school officials with the fore-
seeable effect of policies that contribute to segregation is brushed by some
ironic shadings.143 Distinctions among patterns of segregation have re-
sulted in substantial constraints upon a difficult constitutional task.1"
For those excluded from the ambit of modern equal protection thinking,
enduring or recurring segregation and inequality may be its paramount
legacy.
III. A Modern Separate But Equal Doctrine:
Equal Where Separate
The paramount albeit unstated purpose of the separate but equal
doctrine, when first framed and employed, was to protect "a dominant
race-a superior class of citizens."' 45 A cursory examination of the doc-
trine's early application reveals that it served purposes of separatism and
supremacism rather than fourteenth amendment principles of equality.'46
142. The "realization that apparent symmetry in treatment created only a shallow illusion
of equality prompted the Court in Brown" to embrace an equal protection principle that for
almost 20 years insistently demanded change. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1019.
143. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979). If held to the
same standard, discriminatory intent might be imputed to the Court in connection with analy-
sis that accommodates existing or new forms of segregation.
144. "Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task." Milliken, 418 U.S.
at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted that "[eivery one
knows [it] had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad
cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to
white persons." Id. at 557. He nonetheless subscribed to the notion that the "white race [was
and would] ... continue to be for all time ... the dominant race in this country... in prestige,
in acheivement, in wealth, and in power." Id. at 559. Justice Harlan, however, asserted that
the Constitution was "color-blind," countenancing no official dominant caste. Id. Because the
separate but equal doctrine officially operated to connote inferiority and degrade, id. at 560, he
perceived that the equality component would "not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong
this day done." Id. at 562. Like motives to perpetuate a dominant class were evinced by
antimiscegenation statutes designed "to preserve... racial integrity" and "prevent the 'corrup-
tion of blood', 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and the 'obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an
endorsement of white supremacy." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S 1, 7 (1967). Such legislation
eventually was found to "violate[ ] the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at
12.
146. Once the surface of the doctrine was scratched, it was apparent that the principle was
used to enforce systematically preferential treatment for whites. Thus, a school district could
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Justice Harlan's forecast, that Plessy v. Ferguson would "in time prove to
be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott Case," '14 7 thus proved accurate. 148 Given the disparity between
original rhetoric and modem results, investment in a formula that has
diminishing efficacy is open to similar ridicule. To the extent the desegre-
gation formula may yield "the same separate and inherently unequal ed-
ucation in the future as... ha[s] been unconstitutionally afforded in the
past,"' 149 the principle, despite a nobler birth than its doctrinal predeces-
sor, is vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy.
The notion that "separate" is inherently "unequal" may be wrapped
in prettier constitutional packaging than its doctrinal antecedent, 150 but
the limiting principles that have rigidified the purview of the desegrega-
tion mandate facilitate only limited and evanescent results. 5 ' The phi-
losophy that engendered the separate but equal dpctrine generally evokes
a sense of revulsion preempting any notion that the principle might have
redeeming value.'5 2 The thinking originally associated with the desegre-
gation principle is much more appealing and at least facially does not
evoke repugnance. Still, a doctrine must be assessed not by how nicely it
expresses equal protection sentiments but by how well it actually guaran-
tees equal protection. Given the devolution of the desegregation princi-
ple, what appeared to be an attractive and enlightened analytical
provide schooling to whites while denying it to blacks. See supra notes 48-51 and accompany-
ing text.
147. In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (18 How.) 393, 406 (1857), the Court concluded
that blacks were not citizens and thus not entitled to constitutional protection. The decision
resulted in the destruction of the Court's political base and undercut its moral authority to
such a degree that recovery was a prolonged process.
148. Modem legal literature that discusses the two decisions generally identifies them as
among the Court's most infamous. See, e.g., TRIBE, HONORABLE COURT, supra note 22, at 75,
98.
149. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. The Court, in Brown, wrote in compassionate and sensitive terms, as it noted that
education was essential to development and chances of "succeed[ing] in life" and segregation
"may affect [children's] hearts and minds in a way that may never be undone." 347 U.S. at
493-94. By contrast, in Plessy, the Court evinced a more merciless tone when it ridiculed the
notion "that... enforced separation... stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,"
curtly dismissing such notions as a "fallacy." 163 U.S. at 551.
151. More forceful application or expansion of the desegregation mandate, by contrast,
may have been self-defeating to the extent it merely accelerated resettlement along racial lines.
See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 485 (Powell, I., dissenting).
152. The principle, when discussed, tends to elicit such terms as "notorious" and "demean-
ing." See TRIBE, HONORABLE COURT, supra note 22, at 75; L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1020.
Although those descriptions accurately depict its general application and underlying philoso-
phy, such characterizations need not deter a fresh assessment of whether the principle may
have some relevance to and utility for moder times.
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framework now appears merely to have exchanged "separate but equal"
for separate period.
Although the desegregation principle may be tarnished, given actual
results, the objectives it was designed to pursue remain worthwhile. De-
segregation promised equal educational opportunity and thus equal pro-
tection, but realization of that goal on a comprehensive scale is neither
imminent nor likely in the foreseeable future. Consistent with the spirit
of Brown and a pragmatic appreciation of its limiting principles, and in
the interest of affording a better if not equal start in life and minimizing
the sentencing of successive generations to positions in an underclass,
other avenues for enhancing educational opportunity merit examination
or reassessment.
153
If detached from its repugnant philosophical moorings, a modified
separate but equal concept might afford a departure point for such analy-
sis. Properly constructed, it might address untouched or otherwise resis-
tant forms of segregation and provide some degree of relief in the form of
a better education for those whose constitutional interests otherwise are
sacrificed. 154
Even if an enlightened "equal where separate" doctrine might re-
spond to modern separatism, its embrace would not be risk free. To the
extent desegregation might be identified as the only acceptable formula
for fulfilling equal protection promises, consideration of other alterna-
tives may be perceived as a weakening of equal protection resolve. Still,
the danger of not exploring other methodologies, when comprehensive
and enduring integration is not a foreseeable reality, may be more
profound. The pursuit of desegregation typically necessitates sacrificing
the interests of those in whose name equal educational opportunities are
sought, in hopes of securing long-term gains for many in the future.155
Continuing generational sacrifices are more difficult to justify, however,
to the extent the strategy is singularly adhered to despite emphatically
153. See, e.g., Abramowitz & Jackson, Desegregation: Where Do We Go From Here?, 19
How. L.J. 92, 98-114 (1975); Mays, Comment: Atlanta-Living with Brown Twenty Years
Later, 3 BLACK L.J. 184, 190-92 (1974).
154. Justice Marshall, who contributed largely to masterminding the Court's embrace of
the desegregation principle, has observed that subsequent limiting principles may be "a reflec-
tion of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's
guarantee of equal justice that is the product of neutral principles of law." Milliken, 418 U.S.
at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If so, the case for augmentative policies is that much
stronger.
155. Because of the time consumed by desegregation litigation, it is not unusual that named
plaintiffs and the school generation they represent never receive the constitutional benefits to
which they are entitled. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 862
(5th Cir. 1966); Abramowitz & Jackson, supra note 153, at 92-93.
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negative responses by the Court that likely will persist into the foresee-
able future. Deferral of equal protection satisfaction in anticipation of
more forceful use of desegregation principles, which increasingly have
been narrowed, runs a particularly grave risk of actually abetting those
forces which promote racial subordination.
Inquiry into the cause of modem racial separation for purposes of
drawing constitutional lines and determining constitutional responsibili-
ties may be subject to valid criticism, l"6 but such a response for now is
more academic than pragmatic. More pertinent in a practical sense,
given modem realities, is how to serve equal protection interests when
segregation has become constitutionalized, and how to retain equal pro-
tection gains where dual systems that have been dismantled recur with
the Fourteenth Amendment's blessing. The Court's willingness to coun-
tenance and perpetuate conditions which impair educational opportuni-
ties, undermine self-worth, and reduce opportunities for movement into
the social mainstream, contrasts profoundly with the spirit characteriz-
ing the Court's original embrace of the desegregation principle. 157 Not
only has segregation generally proved to be intractable, it even may be
reintroduced, if properly clothed, where it once had to be eradicated.
Generational sacrifice could be rationalized to the extent anticipated
effectuation of long term equal protection goals made consequent short
term losses acceptable. Difficult as it now may be to defer desegregation
goals and ponder alternatives more responsive to modem realities, the
abiding interest in promoting equal protection concerns and protecting
against erosion of gains secured by the desegregation process may compel
such a choice. Resegregation, unless recognized by the Court as the
product of further discriminatory action, is constitutionally untouchable.
If backsliding is to be deterred, therefore, it apparently must be done by
identifying oppressive societal forces untouched by the desegregation
mandate and by formulating policies that acknowledge majoritarian real-
ities but nonetheless creatively promote equal protection objectives.
A. The Untouched Forces of Oppression
Even when the desegregation mandate is applied, forces that pro-
mote racial subordination may not be touched or altered.'58 Although
156. It is unlikely, in any event, that any school district with a significant minority popula-
tion has not in some way contributed to existing racial segregation. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 252-
53 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
157. It was precisely such concerns that originally motivated the Court to insist upon de-
segregation. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
158. More frequent disciplinary action against black students, for instance, has been attrib-
uted to "white institutional racism." Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Tex.
Fall 19861 DESEGREGATION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the substitution of equalization principles alone might make it too easy
for society to return to separatist patterns, equal protection interests are
served best when the Court remains responsive to oppressive influences
that, whether proximate or remote, betray racist instincts.
Although secondary strategies may not be targeted directly at elimi-
nating racial separation, they would respond to forces which, by perpetu-
ating unequal and inadequate schools or reflecting racist sentiments,
help foster racial subordination. Resorting to such methodologies re-
flects, even if reluctantly, a pragmatic sense that "[w]e live in a world in
which human conduct, often self-seeking and sometimes sordid, as well
as the realities of nature, limits our options."' 59
Even though the duty to desegregate has been substantially quali-
fied, the problem of disparate educational opportunity which the Court
set out to address has not subsided. Despite the risk that consideration
of desegregation alternatives may send an undesired message to segrega-
tion's victims and sympathizers, 6 the interests of educational equity and
perhaps desegregation itself are endangered more by inattention or avoid-
ance. Inferior schools can be upgraded by investing additional resources
into them. So long as certain schools remain isolated or grossly underde-
veloped and afford limited or no passage into the social mainstream, thus
contributing to the creation and perpetuation of an underclass, the no-
tion of equal educational opportunity is flagrantly illusory.
A response premised upon financial aid may invite criticism that
money is the trite rejoinder society affords when it either does not know
what else to do or does not care enough to formulate and implement
thoughtful policy. Immediate upgrading of educational facilities and
programs at least could offer gains which normally may be expected from
an enhanced investment of resources, and thus minimize the possibility
that the learning environment itself would facilitate segregation by con-
tributing to white flight. 161 To the extent improvements were made that
would be necessary to promote effective desegregation anyway, the equal
1974). Such disparities suggest that, even in a desegregated setting, "a pervasive intolerance
[has been evinced] by school officials for all students who are different in any number of ways."
Bell, supra note 25, at 488 n.52 (quoting CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS:
ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 12 (1975)).
159. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 R2d 705, 718 (2d Cir.
1979).
160. See Bell, supra note 25, at 489.
161. See Abramowitz & Jackson, supra note 153, at 110. The Court itself has recognized
that the quality of school facilities significantly influences residential patterns. See Swann, 402
U.S. at 20. Even if desegregation was ordered in an urban setting, for example, resources
would have to be invested to make improvements necessary for the plan to succeed. Thus, to
the extent some schools may be inferior to the point that prescribed attendance would consti-
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protection interests of one generation would not be entirely deferred and
the equal protection prospects of future generations might be enhanced.
B. Pragmatic Responses to Modern Realities
Federal policies, during the 1960's, were crafted to facilitate consti-
tutional challenges of, and to create financial disincentives for state-en-
forced dual school systems. 162 Such measures, originally calibrated to
promote equal protection goals, have diminishing relevance in the urban
context where predominantly one-race schools are largely unreached by
constitutional principles of desegregation. Because much modem segre-
gation is constitutionally tolerable, equal protection values must draw
more heavily upon state and local initiatives and programs to attain or
perpetuate racial balance.
Voluntary or partial busing plans, for instance, may have potential
for curbing desegregation-related declines in white enrollment. 163 Poli-
cies that purportedly attempt to stem white flight, by curbing busing or
reverting to a partial system of neighborhood schools, such as those
which the Court recently let stand in Riddick v. School Board of the City
of Norfolk,164 are vulnerable to criticism that they bend to racist senti-
ments.1 65 Given the modem reach of the desegregation mandate, such
majoritarian sensitive policies may represent one of the few options for
providing to the largest possible number of students in an urban setting
some semblance of a desegregated education.' 66 One-way busing from
cities to suburbs invites criticism that it siphons off the urban schools'
most talented students and constitutes policy dictated by racist attitudes.
Still, such programs may afford better education to participants and re-
flect a pragmatic sense that parents who fled to the suburbs in search of
tute a sanction on students reassigned from better schools, meaningful improvement may be a
necessary "prelude to a program of integration." Keyes, 313 F. Supp. 61, 85 (D. Colo. 1970).
162. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred federal assistance for any
program administered in a racially discriminatory fashion, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare conditioned aid to school districts upon compliance with desegregation or-
ders or submission of a desegregation plan consistent with HEW guidelines. The Act also
authorized the Attorney General to file school desegregation lawsuits on behalf of plaintiffs
unable to bring their own. See E. BARRETr, JR. & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAl. LAW (6th
ed. 1980).
163. See Marek, Education by Decree, 17 NEW PERSPECTIVES 36, 38 (Summer 1985).
164. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 420 (1986).
165. Although white flight cannot justify failure to dismantle a dual school system, it has
been factored into voluntary plans designed to maintain or improve racial balance. See Rid-
dick, 784 F.2d at 528-29 (citing Higgins v. Board of Educ. of City of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d
779 (6th Cir. 1974)).
166. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d at 719.
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educational quality will not be part of plans that require sending their
children back to city schools.
If surveys are accurate in finding most parents of public school chil-
dren voluntarily would enroll them in distant schools with special educa-
tional advantages, 167 the magnet school concept may serve as an
increasingly helpful tool for promoting equal protection interests. Strong
investment in magnet schools actually may be attractive to school offi-
cials and both parents and students.168 For instance, court-ordered
transformation of all Kansas City secondary and middle schools, and
half of the city's elementary schools, into magnet schools with varying
curricular focuses, is calculated to encourage selection of schools on the
basis of interest rather than residence.169 Aside from any effect upon
students, the emphasis upon curricular offering rather than geography
might have particular utility for diverting faculty and resources from
normal tracts dictated by constituency and thus at least indirectly by
race. 170 The magnet concept may be one of the few means available,
given the existence of the de facto principle and seeming inviolability of
district lines, for promoting racially mixed and substantially equal
schools. 171 Even the neighborhood school concept, which so often was
trumpeted by opponents of desegregation, may be useful in areas of a city
where patterns are reasonably integrated. 172
Because resegregation is constitutionally permissible unless found to
be the product of intentional official action, consolidation and preserva-
tion of equal protection gains demand at least the attention and creativity
necessary to effectuate desegregation. Experiments with integration
maintenance suggest, for instance, the utility of incentive programs cal-
culated to influence home buying decisions that would facilitate racial
balance. 173 The practice of steering, which traditionally has reflected dis-
167. A poll in Boston-where court-ordered desegregation triggered violence, friction, ob-
struction, and a mass exodus of white students-demonstrated a willingness to accept a non-
neighborhood school, provided it offered advantages such as magnet programs, special curric-
ula, or smaller classes. See Marek, supra note 163, at 41.
168. See It's Full Steam Ahead for Magnet Schools, Kansas City Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at
Al.
169. See id. The magnet school order requires each school to offer a unique academic, arts-
related, vocational, or pre-professional theme. See id. at All.
170. See K. Helmore & K. Laing, Exiles Among Us, Poor & Black in America, Inadequate
Education is Still Part of the Poverty Problem, Christ. Sci. Mon., Nov. 20, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
171. See Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 192 (1975).
172. Such a scheme, on an experimental basis, has been combined with a program of volun-
tary transfers to effectuate further desegregation. See Marek, supra note 163, at 41.
173. The State of Ohio in 1985, for instance, set aside part of a mortgage revenue bond
issue for black first-time home buyers settling areas with less than a 10% black population, and
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criminatory motives, actually may be useful when it comprises affirma-
tive marketing plans and cooperative efforts by realtors, bankers, and
local officials to create or perpetuate racially balanced living patterns.
174
Such strategies may be augmented by other incentives that, for instance,
might include college tuition credits tied proportionately to the number
of years spent in an integrated school.
175
Integration maintenance, for now, seems to depend largely upon the
willingness of state and local government to institutionalize affirmative
race-conscious policies.' 76 Even where such solicitude exists, difficult
choices are inevitable. Past experience teaches that methodology logi-
cally calculated to desegregate actually may facilitate the recurrence of
segregation. 177 Mandatory crosstown busing, for instance, may spur mi-
gration to suburbs and foster a racially identifiable school system. Thus,
given the modern desegregation principle which is limited in scope and
duration, even traditional desegregation remedies must be scrutinized
carefully to determine whether they actually promote the opposite of
their intended results. 1
78
Where segregation endures and is constitutionally acceptable, result-
ing harms and inequities may not be offset entirely by secondary reme-
dies. Still, inequities may be ameliorated so that expectations associated
with an education might be realized more fully. Although "the mixed
school is the broader, more natural basis for the education of all
youth"'179 and may represent the equal protection ideal, it remains a con-
stitutional mirage for those who are untouched by the desegregation
mandate and attend schools as separate and unequal as those of their
ancestors. Upgraded facilities, enriched programs, and a generally en-
for white first-time purchasers moving into neighborhoods with less than a 60% white popula-
tion. America Moved to the Suburbs, and So Did the Integration Battle, The Washington Post,
Nat'l Weekly Ed., July 14, 1986, at 34, col. 1-2.
174. Programs emerging from such cooperative policymaking have created "'financial in-
centives, including interest rate buy-downs, monthly mortgage supplements and down-pay-
ment loans to home buyers who move into areas where their race is "under-represented.' " Id.
175. See Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 HUM. RTs. 10, 49 (No. 3, 1978).
176. Some communities actually have initiated marketing campaigns to attract and perpet-
uate population diversity. America Moved to the Suburbs, supra note 173.
177. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
178. It must be considered whether desegregation preservation plans, which have disquiet-
ing segregative effects, may be a pretext for racial discrimination. See Riddick, 784 F.2d at
541-43. The possibility of such a pretext would seem to be enhanced, for instance, to the
extent busing and pupil transfer plans were dropped purportedly to deter white flight which
actually had abated for a period of years. Id. at 541.
179. DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools? 4 J. NrGRo EDuc. 328. 335 (1935).
Although a desegregated school has been described as the ideal. -[o]ther things being equal." it
was noted that "things seldom are equal, and in that case. Sympathy. Knowledge. and the
Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer." Id.
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hanced educational environment would represent an affirmative response
to the forces of systematic racial subordination. Assertion of those poli-
cies as a companion to desegregation might help ensure that the failures
of the equal protection principle would not be paid for entirely by those
whose rights and opportunities it was intended to secure.
Conclusion
Central to the desegregation principle is the notion that children
have the right "to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to
reach their full potential as citizens."' 0 What began as a commitment to
eliminate all racially identifiable schools, so that it no longer would be
"possible to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' "181 has de-
volved into a reluctance to address segregation in certain settings, a will-
ingness to countenance its recurrence after a desegregation interval, and
a transfer of responsibility from the judiciary to state and local officials.
Because the primary methodology for enforcing the guarantee has been
restricted, it is essential to identify alternatives that promote the basic
purposes of the equal protection mandate-to eliminate a system that
fosters racial subordination and provide "the best possible educational
opportunity for all children." ' 2
The desegregation concept, as it has developed, leaves unaltered the
reality that "the great mass of urban black children [are] locked in all-
black schools, many of which are as separate and unequal today as they
were in 1954. " '83 Resegregation, moreover, may make desegregation an
essentially futile exercise and constitutionally permissible segregation an
expanding concept. 114 Given the durability of one-race schools in most
urban centers, and their existence beyond the ken of the equal protection
guarantee, the modem desegregation principle seems a more symbolic
than substantive force.
Stretched to its full capacity, an equal where separate doctrine
might mitigate harms not addressed by the desegregation mandate.
Pending meaningful desegregation, however, an equalization principle re-
sponsive to modern separatist realities at least could respond to conse-
180. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
181. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 435.
182. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. Bell, supra note 25, at 515-16.
184. Desegregation in cities such as Boston, Detroit, Dayton, and Sin Francisco was fol-
lowed by drops in white enrollment ranging from approximately 15 to 22% during the imple-
mentation years alone. See Marek, supra note 163, at 39. A large exodus of white students,
especially in cities with a substantial black population, makes racial bolance mathematically
impossible.
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quences probably not contemplated when the separate but equal doctrine
was abandoned and desegregation embraced. If so, a modem equal
where separate analysis actually might help effectuate what the old sepa-
rate but equal doctrine worked to prevent and the desegregation princi-
ple has left untouched.

